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JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES AND THE SHERMAN ACTUNITED STATES v. HUTCHESON
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court brings to a solution,
for the present at least, the long and bitter controversy that has raged over
the question whether the Sherman Anti-Trust Law is to be applied to labor
unions. In this case, United States v. Hutcheson,1 the decision is that courts
must maintain a hands-off policy in all cases of jurisdictional disputes between
unions even though the methods employed by the disputants are restraining
interstate commerce, if their acts are within those permitted by the Clayton
Act. The facts of the Hutcheson case are simple. Four officers of a carpenter's
union were indicted for conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce in violation
of the Sherman Act. 2 The government alleged interference with interstate commerce in beer, during a jurisdictional strike at a brewery company arising out
of a conflict over the right to dismantle machinery between a carpenter's union
and a machinist's union, both of the same parent body, the American Federation of Labor. The acts complained of were: (1) picketing of a brewery and
its tenants; (2) refusing to allow union members to be employed in construction work for the brewery company or its tenant; (3) printing of notices in a
union publication urging a national boycott of the brewery company's beer.
The specific question raised by this case is whether peaceful activities by a
union involved in a jurisdictional dispute with a rival union is a violation of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Supreme Court by a five to two decision
held that disputes between labor unions do not come within the Sherman AntiTrust Act. The majority opinion held that the carpenter's union in refusing
to work for the brewery company, in picketing, etc., was plainly within its
rights and took the view that jurisdictional disputes, being one of the potent
forces in the modern development of industrial unions, fall within the definition
of "labor disputes" in Section 20 of the Clayton Act,3 and hence, acts in
consequence of such disputes are immune under the Act.
The dissent held that the traditional approach 4 of the courts in the past
1. 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941).
2. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. . . ." 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1.
3. 38 STAT. 738, 29 U. S. C. A. § 52: "No restraining order or injunction shall be
granted by any court of the United States, . . . in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons
employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions or employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury
to property or to a property right, . . ." It further provides that no injunctions shall
be issued to prohibit persons from picketing, boycotting, striking or from any other lawful
act in the absence of such labor dispute, whether alone or in concert, acting as a union.
4. Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U. S. 443 (1921); Bedford Stove Co. v. journeyman Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37
(1927).
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to the question of the application of the Anti-Trust laws to labor unions sh'ould
be followed, asserting that the Court was attempting to legislate radically where
Congress had refused to act, and stated that "by resurrecting a rejected construction of the Clayton Act," the majority was usurping the functions of
Congress.5
Labor, since the enactment of the Sherman Act fifty years ago, has insisted
that its attempt to better working conditions, even if an incidental restraint of
interstate commerce results, should not be considered within the prohibition
of the Anti-Trust Law.6
Labor claimed that the Act was not aimed at it by Congress. The reasons
which led to the adoption of the Act have frequently been described. Behind
its enactment was a desire to protect the consuming public and small business
man from oppressive prices and unfair competition arising from control of
industry by huge combinationg of capital. 7 Assuredly there was no public
clamor for the restriction of efforts of organized labor. From a study of the
Act itself,8 little can be learned definitely as to whether labor was meant to be
included or not. At best, it is highly debatable whether Congress meant to
regulate labor unions by this means.
The history of the court's attitude towards the effect of the Act on labor is
the story of a swinging pendulum. Courts, early in its history, determined
that it was applicable to labor 9 Thus in United States v. Workmen's Amalgamnated,'0 in 1893, a labor union conducted a lawful strike in an attempt to
unionize a plant. The court held this to be a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
It said that though the coalition of men, in its origin and general purposes is
lawful, this is no ground of defense, when it undertakes to restrain interstate
2
or foreign commerce.' 1 Similar cases quickly came out of the federal courts.'
Labor was in a very precarious position as the "strike" was in danger of being
outlawed by the Anti-Trust Act since effective strikes usually tend in some way
to interfere with interstate commerce. It was not until 1908 that the question
was presented squarely before the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawler.'3 The
American Federation of Labor had organized a nationwide boycott against hats
5. United States v. Hutcheson, 61 Sup. Ct. 463, 469 (1941).
6. Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 34 IT.L. L. REv. 769.
7. Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 518; Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude
toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation (1939). 23 M . L. REv. 255.

8. See note 2 supra.
9. Some say these decisions are "reactionary". FaA xru-TER AND GRmz-z, Tim LABOR
INjtcTox (1930) 142 et seq.
10. 54 Fed. 994 (E. D. La. 1893).
11. Id. at 1000.
12. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (N.- D. Il. 1894); Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S.
274 (1908).
13. 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
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manufactured by the D. E. Loewe Company, and against stores14 handling
such hats. The Supreme Court decided for the first time that labor unions
were subject to prosecutions under the Act by holding that this secondary
boycott obstructed the free flow of interstate commerce. It is not clear whether
liability was predicated on the ground of illegality of the means employed, a
nation-wide secondary boycott, or because of the restraint of trade by this
means.' 5 Nevertheless it settled the question whether labor unions are within
the scope of the Anti-Trust Act, and decided that measures adopted by labor
unions may be prohibited where the effect is to impose a restraint on interstate
commerce, regardless of labor's aims.' 6
Following labor's protracted pleas for immunity, the Clayton Act, called
labor's Magna Carta7 was passed in 1914. Section 6 and Section 20 were
direct responses to organized labor's cries for relief from the effects of the
judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act. "This statute was the fruit of tinceasing agitation ...

and was designed to equalize before the law the position

of workingman and employer as industrial combatants."'I8 This Act provided
that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce";
that labor unions can lawfully carry out their "legitimate objects" thereto and
14. Such a "secondary boycott" is now considered illegal. The form of pressure usually
characterized as a "secondary boycott" is a combination to influence A, by exerting some
sort of economic or social pressure against persons who deal with A. This has been condemned by federal and state courts whether the means of pressure upon such third persons
dealing with A be a threat of strike, listing on an unfair list, coercion, or publication
notices. A boycott of stores selling hats manufactured by Loewe Co. would be a secondary
boycott. Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S. 418 (1927); Gompers v. Buck
Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Seattle Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed.
1011 (N. D. Calif. 1905).
15. From the Act's terminology and purpose, it seemed clear that the Act sought to
prevent all restraints of trade through combinations, etc., regardless of legality or illegality
of means. Yet in the application of the Act to industrial combinations, the "rule of reason" was developed. Under it a combination is illegal if it is exercising its monopolistic
control unfairly and oppressively. If other competition thrives, and if it also can be
shown that there was no undue enhancement of prices and no unfair practices as against
competitors, the combination, it would seem does not come within the condemnation of
the Act even though a restraint was shown. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States,
221 U. S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 178 (1911);
United States v. United States Steel Co., 251 U. S. 417 (1920). However, in its application to labor, never once did the courts speak of "reason" when applying the Act until
after the passage of the Clayton Act. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U. S. 344 (1922); United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924).
16. "To read into the act a restraint upon the legitimate activities of labor unions is
to give it a meaning which was never intended." Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitutde
toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation (1939) 23 Mwnm. L. REv. 255, 347.
17. Gompers, The Charter of Industrial Freedom (1914) 21 Am. FEDERATONiST 957.
18. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 484 (1921).
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that they are not to be "construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of law." The Clayton Act gave rise to new litigation and to renewed
controversy regarding the status of trade unions in" and out of Congress.
In Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering,19 a union tried to unionize a plant by
means of a sympathetic strike in aid of a secondary boycott. The Court found
a direct restraint on interstate commerce. The Court construing Section 6
said that labor unions can lawfuly carry out their legitimate objects, but once
they depart from normal, legitimate objects they will be considered in restraint
of trade. The Court held that any method resulting in the obstruction of
interstate commerce was illegal though the avowed object of the union was to
unionize. Section 20 of the Act prohibited the granting of injunctions and
restraining orders only in the event of controversies arising out of disputes
concerning terms and conditions of employment, labor disputes. Therefore, the
Court by limiting the definition of "labor disputes" in Section 20, to disputes
between the proximate employer-employee relationship rendered ineffective
any aid from indictment under the Sherman Act. 20
Through these dark labor days, one decision appeared that temporarily
brightened the horizon for labor unions.2 1 Though impliedly assuming that
anti-trust acts applied to labor, the Court, at long last, seemed to recognize
that the resulting incidental restraint on trade was not the primary purpose of
labor's efforts but an incidental object or at most a means of forcing unionization. In this case, applying the "rule of reason", the Court held that a labor
strike should not be considered in violation of the Sherman Act. As every
serious strike interferes with interstate commerce, it would be unreasonable to
consider strikes within the Act. Thus, leaving the strike as an effective labor
22
weapon and overruling earlier anti-labor cases.
However if anything survived of the roseate hopes aroused by the Clayton
Act, it evaporated with Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters
Ass'n. 23 Here, the Supreme Court held that the refusal of stone cutters, in every
state, to work on non-union stone produced in an Indiana*stone quarry was a
violation of the Sherman Act. The union contended that their sole purpose in
refusing to work on the stone was in an effort to unionize the quarry. The
19.

254 U. S. 443, 469 (1921).
LABOR AND T
S=xRsrAx Act (1930) 99 et seq. However, in the Duplex
case, Mr. justices Brandeis, Holmes and Clark dissented vigorously, finding on these facts,
that the acts of the labor unions were justified.
21. United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924). A strike was called
against an employer to secure better terms of employment. Through illegal picketing and
intimidation, manufacture of goods for shipment was prevented, held, not a conspiracy
to restrain interstate commerce within the Act.
22. United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924). Cf. United States v.
Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (E. D. La. 1893); United States v.
Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (N. D. Ill. 1894).
23. 274 U. S. 37 (1927).

20. BRmAxi,
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Court, conceding this to be the ultimate aim, declared that regardless of the
benefits to labor, a restraint of trade was not justified. In a vigorous dissent,
Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes, protested that by
the use of secondary boycotts the union had merely refrained from aiding and
abetting the enemy. Continuing, Brandeis, J., said: " . .. if ...refusal to work
can be enjoined, Congress created by the Sherman Law and the Clayton Act,
an instrument for imposing restraints upon labor which reminds of involuntary
'24
servitude.
With the failure of the Clayton Act' to abate the evils it was intended to
remedy, protests against the judicial emasculation of the Act were immediate
and strong. In 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 25 was passed to remove the
fetters upon trade union activities which according to judicial construction,
Section 20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched. These sections of the NorrisLaGuardia Act limited the powers of federal courts in issuing injunctions against
labor unions in labor disputes; and further curtailed this power by a liberal
definition of the term "labor dispute". 26 This Act does not however prevent
the application of the anti-trust laws to organized labor. As applied to labor
27
unions, the Act only sanctions the concerted activities of labor if peaceful.
Hence, anti-trust laws cannot be the basis of suits in labor disputes, in cases
28
where the defendants are not engaged in fraud or violence.
With the depression, the United States became more labor conscious. A more
liberal attitude seems to have been adopted by the courts. In a labor dispute
similar to that seen in the Duplex and Bedford cases, a labor union was held not
to have violated the Sherman Act. 29 The unionization of employees in the
building trade was not considered a conspiracy even though an incidental
restraint resulted. Then in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 30 the
Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act enlarged the scope of Section 20 of
24. Id. at 65. FRANlEru
R AND GREENE, TnE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 7, indicates
that in previous cases, at least, the decisions were substantiated by some illegality or
violence by labor. Here this was not present.
25. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115.
26. 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 113. Labor dispute under this act, was interpreted
to include any controversies over terms and conditions of employment between persons
not occupying the proximate relationship of employer-employee. It was only required
that there exist a substantial relationship, e.g., dispute between employees of a factory and
its general distributor.
27. 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 106.
28. Cinderella Theatre v. Signwriters Union, 6 F. Supp. 164, 169 (E. D. Mich. 1934);
United States v. Drivers Union, 32 F. Supp. 594 (D. C. D. C. 1940).
29. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morsin, 289 U. S. 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (strike
against building contractors to compel employment of union labor. Contra: Aeolian Co.
v. Fischer, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); International Brotherhood v. Western
Union, 6 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
30. 303 U. S. 552 (1938) (organization interested in the procuring of employment for
members of its race).
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the Clayton Act defining labor disputes. The Supreme Court found that the
purpose of this Act was to legalize and sanction the use of peaceful persuasion
in labor disputes. It also said: "The legislative history of the Act demonstrates
that it was the purpose of the Congress further to extend the prohibitions of
the Clayton Act ... and to obviate the results of the judicial construction of
that Act. ' 31 This liberal departure from decisions like those in the Bedford
and32Duplex cases continued and reached its climax in Leader v. Apex Hosiery
Co. Though there was violence and damage done by the union members and
an incidental restraint resulted, the anti-trust acts were held inapplicable3 3 The
test is not whether unlawful acts were committed by the defendants but whether
a combination or conspiracy was formed by them with the intent to restrain
commerce. 4
In summarizing the earlier cases interpreting the Act, which lay the foundation and legal precedent for present actions, it is said that these decisions were
made at a time when there was too great a willingness on the part of the federal
courts to use the Sherman Act as a means of outlawing labor's ends and tactics
which didn't square with the court's views of economic and social policy.3 5
These cases further indicated a widespread determination to check coercive
activities on the part of union organization,3 6 and thus eventually, 37to utilize the
Act as a device for the regulation of activities of organized labor.
Recently, under the government's latest anti-trust drive against labor and
capital, two cases have arisen in different federal districts. 8 In United States
v. Drivers,39 the union was indicted for conspiracy in restraint of trade because
seemingly it resorted to violence and intimidation. Here, just as in Loewe v.
Lawler,40 the court failed to say whether the union was guilty under the Act
because of a conspiracy in restraint of trade or because the union resorted to
31. Id. at 562.
32. 108 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), aff'd, 310 U. S. 469 (1940) (union members
"sat down" to induce the company to enter into a closed shop agreement, violence and
damages resulted). Gregory, Labor's Coercive Activities -underthe Sherman Act-The Apex

Case (1940) 7 U. oF CnE. L. Rav. 347.
33. Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 108 F. (2d) 71, 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938). Heie the
court at p. 74 said: "We entertain no doubt that the appellants (union) should be compelled in the appropriate forum to answer in damages... " But the court found that the
union was not liable for treble damages as provided for by the anti-trust laws.
34. Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
35. Lee, Labor and Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 74 N. Y. L. Rav. 13, 22.
36. Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation (1939) 23 Miw. L. REv..255.
37. Gregory, Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case (1940)
7 U. oF Cmx. L. REv.347.
38. United States v. Drivers, 32 F. Supp. 594 (D. C. D. C. 1940); United States v.
Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo. 1940), aff'd 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941).
39. 32 F. Supp. 594 (D. C. D. C. 1940).
40. 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
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unlawful means. The court did find, however, that there was only an incidental
restraint, previously never considered enough to prosecute unions. Seemingly,
therefore, the union was held liable under the Anti-Trust Act for violence. Moreover the court, there, seems to think that jurisdictional strikes are directed
towards objects that unions may not aim at. This decision seemed to fall in
line with previous anti-labor decisions. However, this case seems to be overruled by the decision in the Hutcheson case. In refusing to consider the NorrisLaGuardia Act as affecting criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act, the
court in the Drivers case said the immunity from injunctions by the NorrisLaGuardia Act was limited to civil injunction suits. In the Hutcheson case,
the Court showed little patience for so narrow a construction and said that
it is improper to argue that acts, which on the equity side of the court are
allowable conduct, are not permissible under the criminal law. So, to hold the
Norris-LaGuardia Act solely applicable to equity suits for injunctions, would
be reading such legislation in a spirit of mutilating narrowness. It would be
interesting to speculate on what would happen to the decision in the Drivers
case should the union officials appeal to the Supreme Court.
In the Hutcheson case, the district court first dismissed the indictment. 4'
However, it distinguished the Drivers case, on the grounds that violence, threats
and force there accompanied the jurisdictional strike. Seemingly the cases,
therefore, appear to be reconcilable. However, the language used in the Drivers
case seems to condemn the very idea of a jurisdictional strike, with or without
violence, because it aims at an inevitable breach of contract of another union
42
with an employer, contrary to the spirit of the National Labor Relations Act.
The question of jurisdictional strikes has become increasingly important and
indications seem to point to a more increased importance in view of current
problems. Since the advent of the two major "parent" labor organizations, the
Committee of Industrial Organization and the American Federation of Labor,
these jurisdictional disputes have taken on national importance and their effects
are nationally felt. A "jurisdictional strike" is the strike occasioned by disputes
between either, (a) two local unions of the same parent body, or (b) two
identical unions in different parent bodies. The dispute is as to which union
shall supply the labor for a certain type of work, or, in other words, which
union is to occupy a certain working field. The strike, an historic labor weapon,
is used customarily to support demands of labor for shorter hours, higher
wages or better working conditions-in all these cases the conflict arising between employee and employer. Here, in jurisdictional strikes is a strike against
the employer used because of "internal" labor problems; problems that seemingly should be settled within labor's ranks without harming industry. However, we find that the jurisdictional strikes have been supported as lawful by
41.
42.

32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo. 1940).
44 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151.
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a number of our courts in the past. 43 Now, in view of Justice Frankfurter's
strong opinion, holding that such disputes are "labor disputes" within the
definition of "labor disputes" as defined by the Clayton Act and clarified and
broadened by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Hutcheson decision must be interpreted as meaning that the government must maintain a hands-off attitude in
all jurisdictional disputes unless the conduct of the parties is not protected
by the Clayton Act or unless the government finds labor and non-labor groups
acting in cooperation.
Justice Frankfurter, in arriving at the majority opinion, has placed the
limitation of non-labor cooperation upon the broad rule that peaceful activities
conducted by labor unions (when such acts are within the Clayton Act immunity) cannot be the basis for prosecutions under the Sherman Act. But such
44
activities must not be carried on in collaboration with non-labor groups.
This, however, is by way of dictum for in the Hutcheson case there was no
evidence of non-labor or employer collaboration. But this limitation was more
definitely ruled in United States v. Brims.45 No doubt courts will continue to
place this limitation upon labor union activities and will hold that collusive
agreements between union and employers to restrain trade may be prosecuted
under the Sherman Act.
At the present time it seems settled that the question whether labor union
conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act is to be determined by
reading the Sherman Act, Section 20 of the Clayton Act and the NorrisLaGuardia Act as a code for labor conduct. As long as its activities are conducted peacefully and not in collaboration with non-labor groups, a union may
strike, picket or boycott an employer without fear of criminal prosecution
under the Sherman Act regardless of any restraining effect such activities may
have on interstate commerce.
43. International Brotherhood v. International Union, 106 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 9th,
1939); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938); Lauf v. Sherman, 303 U. S. 323 (1938); Terrio v. S. N. Nielson, 30 F. Supp. 77 (D. C. La. 1939).
44. United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549 (1926), involving a conspiracy of mill work
manufacturers (non-labor group), building contractors (non-labor group), and union carpenters (labor group) whereby the union carpenters agreed not to work on non-union goods,
doing this in the interests of labor.
45. 272 U. S. 549 (1926).

